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How ‘smart’ are Smart Specialisation strategies? 
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Abstract
The introduction of Smart Specialisation (S3) as a fundamental pillar of the 2014 reform of the 
European Union (EU) Cohesion Policy has represented a significant strategic shift in European 
development intervention. S3 strategies are aimed at mobilising the economic potential of each country 
and region of the EU, by allowing a more place-based and bottom-up approach to development. 
However, despite the salience that S3 has acquired in a short period of time, there has been no European-
wide evaluation of the extent to which S3 strategies truly reflect the economic characteristics and 
potential of the territories where they are being implemented. This paper examines the characteristics 
of S3 strategies across Europe – by focusing on their development axes, economic/scientific domains, 
and policy priorities – to assess whether this is the case. The results show that S3 strategies display a 
proliferation of objectives, a problem which particularly affects those areas with weaker government 
quality. Moreover, strategies are generally loosely connected with the intrinsic conditions of each region 
and mostly mimic what neighbouring areas are doing. The lack of more concise and focused S3 
strategies is likely to undermine the effectiveness of what is, otherwise, a very interesting and 
worthwhile policy experiment.
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1. Introduction 
Smart specialisation (S3) occupies a special position in European policymaking. Analytically, 
the concept has its intellectual origins in the literature on innovation policy and on new forms 
of industrial policy. However, the concept is still far from being fully-articulated. This has not 
prevented it from gaining powerful track in the realm of policy, becoming, since the 2014 
reform, one of the backbones of the European Union (EU) regional development policy, a
fundamental constituent of the EU’s Cohesion Policy. As noted by Foray et al (2011), 
Elaborated by a group of academic “experts” in 2008, [smart specialisation] very 
quickly made a significant impact on the policy audience, particularly in Europe. 
[…] Such a success story in such a short period of time is a perfect example of 
“policy running ahead of theory”: while smart specialisation seems to be already 
a policy hit and policy makers show some frenetic engagements towards smart 
specialisation, the concept is not tight in particular as an academic concept.
(Foray et al., 2011: 3)
But what is smart specialisation? And why is it so important in the EU’s Cohesion Policy? 
Following Midtkandal and Sörvik (2012: 1), smart specialisation is a process aiming to develop 
a vision in order to identify the areas of intervention of greatest strategic potential in every 
territory. As such, it represents a ‘place-based’ development strategy that includes not only 
identifying, through what is known as the entrepreneurial discovery process, where the 
potential of every territory lies, but also developing a system of governance involving multi-
stakeholder mechanisms in order to set strategic priorities and systems of intervention 
(Midtkandal and Sörvik, 2012:1).
The adoption of smart specialisation is one of the key elements of European policy since 2014 
and has represented a significant strategic shift in Cohesion Policy. The aim of the reform was 
not only to raise the effectiveness of the policy at large (e.g., by improving the sectoral targeting 
of funding and creating production synergies), but also to introduce a new way of thinking 
about local economic development: from a ‘one-size-fits-all’ to a more place-based 
intervention, from a top-down approach to a more bottom-up one, and from an objective of 
economic convergence among European regions, to a multitude of objectives more adapted to 
the conditions and potential of every region.
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Smart specialisation has been designed as a policy mechanism that can support regions (and 
countries) to unleash their growth potential by helping them identify and harness their dynamic 
(and latent) comparative and competitive advantages. 
As a new policy – and new concept – however, there is still limited knowledge about its 
effectiveness and impact. Because it has been implemented for the first time at a large scale 
during the programming period 2014-2020 – and despite some early attempts at assessing its 
impact (e.g. Iacobucci and Guzzini, 2016; McCann and Ortega-Argilés, 2016; Crescenzi et al., 
2018; Gianelle et al., 2019) – it will take some time after the end of 2020 for a concrete picture 
of its effectiveness to emerge. What is more surprising, however, is that there are very limited 
accounts of how S3 strategies across Europe really reflect the endogenous potential of all 
regions for which an entrepreneurial discovery process was conducted and, subsequently, a 
smart specialisation strategy drafted. In other words, we lack a complete picture of how ‘smart’
smart specialisation truly is.
This is what this paper intends to do. We set out to offer a comprehensive analysis of the 
population of regional S3 strategies currently in operation in the EU with the aim of assessing 
how independent they are from one another and how they are influenced by differences in 
economic and institutional characteristics – quality of government, economic and technological 
capacities – across regions of Europe.
In order to do that, we first document and analyse some key features of the population of S3 
strategies, focusing on the prevalence of different economic/scientific domains and policy 
objectives within and across regions (the breadth of specialisations per region and the 
coincidence of specialisations across regions). We then examine how groups of regions cluster 
together with regard to their economic priorities (domains) and through this identify five 
distinct clusters of (smart) sectoral specialisations across the EU. Last, we perform an 
exploratory analysis of key features of the S3 strategies across space, seeking to understand 
whether the policy approach as a whole contributes to a ‘smarter’ policy at an aggregate level
– in other words, whether the ‘smart’ strategies adopted at the local level truly match the local 
economic context and can therefore be taken as a suitable approach for mobilising the 
economic potential of Europe as a whole. This is achieved by assessing, using regression 
analysis, the drivers of the observed heterogeneity in the key characteristics of regional 
strategies, offering a unique insight into how the policy creates or resolves spatial divisions in 
Europe. 
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2. Smart specialisation: concept and practice 
2.1 What is smart specialisation? 
The concept of smart specialisation is centred on the idea that each territory should concentrate
development intervention in certain areas of specialisation where it holds significant potential 
and/or competitive advantage in order to sustain productivity growth (Foray et al., 2009;
Asheim et al, 2017). This idea emerged following widespread criticism of ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
policy approaches and a vision according to which development intervention should be built 
around existing place-based capabilities and potential (Barca, 2009; Foray et al., 2009, 2011; 
Barca et al., 2012; McCann & Ortega-Argilés, 2015). Smart specialisation was conceived as
an answer to questions about how to define targets for place-based policies (Balland et al., 
2019). The answer proposed by the ‘Knowledge for Growth’ expert group (Foray et al., 2009) 
was that territories should develop their competitive advantage around sectors where they
possess existing strengths, leveraging those capabilities. 
According to this approach, context matters for the evolution of innovation and economic 
systems. The development pathway of territories is eminently driven by ongoing dynamics and 
inherited socio-economic/institutional structures. Hence, each place should design its
development strategy with the aim of fostering the specialisation in knowledge-related sectors,
depending on already existing assets (McCann & Ortega-Argilés, 2015) and within the 
principles of ‘diversified specialisation’ (Farhauer and Kröll, 2012). Consequently, policy-
prioritisation within each S3 strategy should be done by looking for development opportunities 
in selected domains where a particular territory has advantages or a greater potential (Foray et 
al., 2009; 2011; David et al., 2009).
While, initially, the formulation of smart specialisation was that of a purely sectoral policy with 
no spatial dimension, its proponents later came to the conclusion that this approach had great 
potential for the promotion of economic growth at the regional level in particular (McCann & 
Ortega-Argilés, 2014; Foray, 2015). This conceptualisation of S3 recognises the uniqueness of 
local areas and their economic trajectories and assumes that each region should develop its own
and unique place-specific development plan. This applies equally to economically strong 
regions as well as to weaker ones. For lagging territories, smart specialisation is seen as a way 
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to concentrate resources in a few sectors with sufficient potential to achieve long-lasting 
economic impacts (Foray et al., 2009; Foray, 2015).
The entrepreneurial discovery process inherent to every S3 strategy implies identifying the 
economic and technological sectors on which to invest based on a number of guidelines. First,
interventions should support ‘regional embeddedness’, by identifying activities with the greater 
possibility of achieving a critical mass to generate significant economic impacts (Fedeli et al., 
2019). Second, they should enhance linkages across domains, prioritising sectors that would 
eventually lead to ‘related diversification’, i.e. the development of technological activities 
related to the existing knowledge bases (Balland et al., 2019), following fundamental aspects 
of evolutionary economic geography, such as path dependency and related variety (Frenken et 
al., 2007; Boschma & Iammarino, 2009; Asheim et al., 2011). Third, S3 requires 
experimentation and innovation in policy design, alongside a timely monitoring and evaluation,
and constant involvement of local-level actors (Foray et al., 2011; Foray, 2015; McCann & 
Ortega-Argilés, 2015; Fedeli et al., 2019). As such, S3 strategies assign regional government 
authorities a central role. They are expected to perform a rigorous self-assessment of local 
potential, involving the key economic agents active in the territory (Boschma, 2014).
The conceptual underpinnings of smart specialisation informed both the reform of the EU’s
Cohesion Policy for the 2014-2020 programming period and the Europe 2020 Agenda,
implying that EU development policies require regions to adopt place-based policies tailored 
on their existing economic assets, through the collaborative involvement of local communities 
and institutions. Smart specialisation has become an ex-ante conditionality of Cohesion Policy 
(Charles et al., 2012), as every EU region had to submit S3 strategies in order to be eligible for 
EU funding (Iacobucci, 2014). To help regions develop their S3 strategies, the European 
Commission established a ‘Platform’, hosted by the EU Joint Research Centre in Seville, 
offering regions guidance and support in identifying the most promising areas in terms of 
economic opportunities (Fedeli et al., 2019). 
2.2 Potential shortcomings of S3 
One of the recurrent critiques of S3 is that it may promote a culture of ‘picking winners’, 
protecting already existing industrial champions (Fedeli et al, 2019). However, the smart 
specialisation concept prescribes a strategy of ‘choosing races’ (Hughes, 2012), which implies
‘betting’ on potentially successful domains. This is what makes S3 truly place-based and 
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applicable to both more and less developed regions – the policy assumes that there is room for 
profitable investments also in areas where the ground for economic growth may initially seem 
less fertile. Yet, a number of pre-existing conditions which may be found in peripheral regions, 
such as limited entrepreneurial spirit, lack of industrial diversity, or inadequate market size,
entail that identifying policy priorities in backward areas is more complicated (Iacobucci & 
Guzzini, 2016). This perceived lack of potential may lead backward regions to choose rather 
large areas of specialisation, selecting a high number of investment domains at the expense of 
existing sectors (Boschma, 2014; Capello & Kroll, 2016).
A similar issue may arise if resources are misallocated towards existing industrial targets for 
purely political interests and rent-seeking (Camagni et al., 2014). This would happen if policy 
priorities are not established on the basis of economic logic and are, therefore, disconnected 
from the needs of local communities. This is far more frequent if local governments are corrupt 
or lack the basic competences to produce effective policies. Hence, poor institutions and low 
local government quality represent substantial barriers for a successful design and
implementation of S3 strategies (Rodríguez-Pose et al., 2014; McCann & Ortega-Argilés, 
2015; Rodríguez-Pose & Di Cataldo, 2015; Capello & Kroll, 2016; Incaltarau et al., 2019;
Rodríguez-Pose, 2020). The bottom-up nature of S3 implies that local actors – especially
policy-makers – hold large responsibilities in the design and implementation phases, meaning 
that poor local government quality may jeopardise the capacity to select areas of intervention
in a truly effective manner (Farole et al., 2011).
Another issue complicating the operationalisation of S3 strategies is that it has become an ex-
ante conditionality for 2014-2020 Cohesion Policy. This fast conversion from theory to 
practice implies that policy intervention has taken place without a solid evidence-base and 
without adequate scrutiny of its strengths and weaknesses (Morgan, 2015). There has been 
limited exchange of experiences across jurisdictions that would provide indications on how to 
properly apply S3 in each context (Morgan, 2015). This fast adoption has been criticised – even 
by the creators of the S3 concept themselves (Foray et al., 2011).
2.3 Early evaluations 
Given its novelty, there has been limited research of the effectiveness in the application of S3 
strategies, but some analyses are starting to emerge. Iacobucci & Guzzini (2016), for example, 
consider the way in which S3 sectoral priorities have been defined by Italian regions, revealing
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that key concepts such as ‘relatedness’ and ‘connectivity’ of technological domains have been
overlooked as guiding principles behind S3. Mostly, intervention has been defined on intuition
and anecdotal evidence, and, in a majority of cases, without any clear justification. 
Furthermore, identifying areas of specialisation has been more complicated in weaker regions
(Iacobucci & Guzzini, 2016). Poor institutions were at the root of these flaws, leading to what 
has been deemed as too broad, not sufficiently embedded, or not relevant S3 priorities in 
backward areas of Italy.
Gianelle et al. (2019) have examined how S3 priorities have been defined in Italian and Polish 
regions. They note that, while in some cases the chosen investment activities represent suitable 
S3 priorities, in at least 11 out of 39 regions the innovation areas prioritised in S3 strategies do 
not reflect the expected S3 criteria. They reveal that S3 in some regions, far from providing 
clear targets, identify a far too large number of priorities, covering basically all economic areas,
thus contradicting the basic S3 principle of selective intervention.
Finally, while a full impact analysis of S3 cannot be conducted yet, because of the newness of 
the strategies, Crescenzi et al. (2018) provide evidence on the effectiveness of a precursor of 
S3 interventions: the requirement for local businesses in the South of Italy to submit project 
applications based on the identification of their own priorities and collaboration strategies with 
other firms and other research-active local stakeholders in order to secure R&D funding during 
the programming period 2007-2013. The authors report that the project had limited impact on 
additional investments, value added, and employment, because of ‘overshooting’ – selecting 
technological domains that were too advanced with the aim of maximising the chances of 
receiving funding, but that failed to create synergies with the local production structure 
(Crescenzi et al., 2018). 
However, and to the extent of our knowledge, no research has so far conducted an analysis of 
how focused S3 strategies are and how this may relate to the local economic context of each 
region. From related literature, we know that the design, deployment, and overall effectiveness 
of regional development policies are influenced by the characteristics – institutional, economic, 
or other – of the regions. For example, Crescenzi (2005) has shown for EU regions that the 
effectiveness of local innovation policy is conditioned by local characteristics, such as 
geographical accessibility and levels of human capital. For the case of the Common 
Agricultural Policy, Henke et al (2018) indicated that the effectiveness of policy 
implementation is influenced by national norms and institutional path dependencies. A more 
extensive literature exists on what determines the success and failure of Cohesion Policy 
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(Crescenzi et al, 2018) with a range of factors identified, including the type of prioritised 
expenditures (Rodríguez-Pose and Fratesi, 2004), the coordination of expenditures with other 
policies (Crescenzi et al, 2015), and, more recently, the targeting of expenditures on regional 
needs (Di Cataldo and Monastiriotis, 2020) or on existing regional strengths (Sotiriou and 
Tsiapa, 2015). Informed by this literature, our analysis of the features of smart specialisation 
strategies constitutes a unique attempt to assess aspects of policy design in this new policy area. 
3. Descriptive features of  smart specialisation strategies 
The analysis uses the information concerning the S3 strategies adopted by European regions,
as recorded in the Smart Specialisation JRC Platform.1 This database collects all the S3 
strategies from every territory (country or NUTS1/NUTS2/NUTS3 region), including the date 
(from 2014 onwards) in which the strategy was submitted to the platform. For each territory,
the Platform reports the full set of sub-strategies2 adopted under the S3 framework. For each 
of these it lists the sectors of economic activity (labelled economic domains according to
Eurostat's NACE2 sectoral classification) on which investment efforts will focus, as well as the 
scientific domains associated to these, defined along the Nomenclature for the Analysis and 
Comparison of Scientific Programmes and Budgets (NABS 2007). Finally, each axis lists its 
policy objectives, i.e. the broad areas of intervention to which it will contribute. These are 
related to the ‘Societal Grand Challenges’ identified in Horizon 2020 and the headline policies 
in the Innovation Union Flagship Initiative. They include, among others, Nature & biodiversity,
Sustainable innovation, Creative and Cultural Industries, Key Enabling Technologies (KETs),
Social Innovation, and the Digital Agenda.
The coding of the strategies along the key dimensions (economic and scientific domains and 
policy objectives) is conducted by policy experts at the Joint Research Centre of the European 
Commission in Seville. Although any coding involves potential problems of misclassification,
the fact that the task is concentrated on one team ensures consistency in the classifications 
produced. In our analysis, we present the examination of the S3 strategies assuming that the 
official information about them is not systematically inaccurate in any of the dimensions that 
we discuss here.  
1 Retrieved from https://s3platform.jrc.ec.europa.eu/map.
2 Henceforth, we refer to these as axes, to avoid conflation with the overall S3 strategies of regional/territories. 
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3.1 Mapping S3 strategies 
Our starting point is a visual representation of S3 strategies across Europe for all countries and
regions that submitted S3 strategies to the European Commission for the 2014-2020 period.
Figure 1 depicts the number of axes within each S3 strategy, providing a descriptive picture of 
regions and countries with ongoing S3 strategies, separately for national-level strategies (panel 
(a)) and for sub-national ones (panel (b)). As can be seen, despite S3 being conceived as part 
of EU Regional Policy, it has been adopted also by a substantial number of countries at the 
national level; while in a number of EU countries – Portugal, Germany, Greece, Austria, 
Denmark, Poland, Romania, and Sweden – both regional and nationwide S3 strategies have 
been adopted. In the remaining EU member-states, S3 is conducted either at the national (i.e. 
Latvia or Slovakia) or regional (i.e. Belgium, France, Italy) level. Some non-EU countries have 
also been lured by the glow of S3, either at national – Ukraine, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia,
Montenegro, Moldova, and Albania – or regional – Norway and two Turkish regions – level.3
Finally, panel (b) reveals that the NUTS level at which regional S3 strategies have been 
designed and implemented varies across European countries. In Germany, smart specialisation 
strategies are being conducted at NUTS1 (Länder) level. In most other countries the level 
chosen is NUTS2. In Scandinavian countries the level is NUTS3. A peculiar case is that of the 
United Kingdom, where all NUTS1 Home Countries – England (not shown in the map), Wales, 
Scotland, and Northern Ireland – have submitted a strategy, while a small number of NUTS2 
regions in England also have one.
Figure 1 also displays that the number of axes within each S3 strategy differ widely across 
Europe. The country with the largest number of axes is Portugal, with 15, while Bulgaria has 
only 4 (Figure 1, Panel (a)). At the regional level the difference is even sharper. Galicia in 
Spain has 15, while Peloponnese in Greece is limited to 2 and Hordaland in Norway to only 1
(panel (b)).
3 EU’s neighbouring countries and Candidate Member States were given the opportunity to participate in the S3 
programme (https://s3platform.jrc.ec.europa.eu/eu-neighbourhood).
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Figure 2 presents the number of Economic and Scientific domains identified by each S3
regional strategy, while Figure 3 displays the number of Policy objectives. Economic and 
scientific domains represent the key investment targets of S3 strategies and are intended to 
indicate the sectors in which the region aims to ‘specialise’. It becomes evident from Figure 2 
that some S3 strategies have disproportionally high numbers of economic and scientific 
domains. Hence, the main takeaway is that in many EU regions there has been a ‘proliferation’ 
of both economic and scientific domains of S3 strategies (Figure 2). Such ‘proliferation’ is 
prevalent across Spanish regions. Navarra, Aragón, Castilla-La Mancha, Murcia, and
Andalucía identify over 30 economic domains, while Valencia, Cataluña, Andalucía, Galicia, 
the Basque County, and Navarra list more than 60 scientific domains among their priorities.
Navarra tops the S3 ranking with 88 scientific targets.
Many Belgian, Dutch, French, Italian, and Polish regions are similarly ambitious in terms of 
economic and scientific domains. The region of Calabria lists 48 economic domains, 
Groningen and Campania 45, Mazovia 41, Marche 40, and Flanders 39. The Italian regions of
Calabria, Campania, Marche, Emilia-Romagna, Lazio all have over 30 scientific domains in 
their S3 strategy (76 in Marche alone). Of the 16 Voivodships in Poland, all but 5 have 
strategies with over 30 scientific domains. Internal contrasts in the number of scientific 
domains within countries are also flagrant. Whereas Tuscany lists only 7 scientific domains 
and Lombardy – the largest region in Italy – 11, Marche has a total of 76. In France, Limousin 
boasts 55, while Île-de-France included only 17. And in Greece, the starkest contrast is between 
43 in Thessaly, on the one hand, and 14 in Attica or 8 in the Peloponnese, on the other.
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Figure 2. Number of economic and scientific domains of S3 strategies by region.
(a) Economic domains
(b) Scientific domains
The number of policy objectives also varies sharply, ranging from the single-digit figure of 
almost all Norwegian regions to the very high figures in many Spanish, Romanian, Italian, 
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Polish, and French regions. Bretagne, in France, is the region with the highest number of policy 
targets in its S3 strategy, with 50 identified objectives.
Figure 3. Number of policy objectives of S3 strategies by region.
It should be noted that the presence of a large number of areas of specialisation does not 
necessarily reflect lack of ‘smartness’ in any particular strategy. Indeed, S3 strategies are not 
about selecting sectors per se – but rather about identifying “missions” (Mazzucato, 2018), i.e., 
sets of activities across sectors, which contribute to a particular specialisation (see also Rodrik, 
2004). In this sense, it should not be of surprise if some regions’ S3 strategies list an unusually 
large number of domains. However, given that the majority of regional S3 strategies list 18 
economic domains or fewer, our sense is that strategies which list economic domains well 
above this number – perhaps half or more of the entire set of sectors in the economy – are 
perhaps not sufficiently fine-tuned. To a sceptic, given that listed sectors within S3 strategies 
are de facto potential beneficiaries of Cohesion Policy funds, the implied proliferation of 
specialisations in some S3 strategies may even be a signal that some strategies are driven by a 
“something for everybody” logic. In this regard – and to the extent that this may be true – there 
is scope for improvement in the logic, focus, and precision of the regional specialisations 
pursued under the S3 framework. 
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3.2 Are S3 strategies truly distinctive? 
Besides the point raised above, the widespread proliferation of economic and scientific 
domains and policy objectives questions additionally, and to a considerable extent, how ‘smart’ 
S3 strategies truly are. Many European regions seem incapable of truly identifying a narrow 
list of priorities – and the EU of curtailing the multiplication of policy objectives. The 
proliferation of domains may also signal an inability to present distinctive regional strategies
that would reflect the conditions and potential of each individual region. In order to assess 
whether S3 strategies across Europe are sufficiently distinctive or if, inversely, they overlap 
significantly in their priorities, thus reproduce the same economic and innovation domains and 
the same policy priorities over and over again, we proceed as follows. First, we examine the 
frequency of different domains across regional strategies – looking at the sectoral, scientific 
and policy content of each strategy. Second, we perform a cluster analysis, this time only for 
the economic domains, aiming at classifying regions into groups of specialisations.4
Table 1 list the 20 most frequent economic domains, scientific domains, and policy objectives
in the 244 S3 national and regional S3 strategies analysed. A number of domains occur across 
a high share of S3 strategies, indicating either that many territories have overlapping 
specialisations or that there is a tendency to repeat strategies among countries and regions. 169 
territories (or 69% of the total) identify ‘Information service activities’ as one of their 
specialisations. ‘Computer programming’ appears as a priority in 68% of strategies. ‘Health 
promotion’ is the most common scientific domain, covered by 67% of strategies, and an 
implausible 157 (64%) specialise in ‘Medical sciences’. A similar example for the policy 
objectives is the case of ‘Advanced materials’, which forms part of the specialisation strategies 
of 131 regions/countries in the EU. 
These frequencies indicate the presence of very similar priorities across many S3 strategies,
raising the important question of the extent to which the S3 framework is producing strategies 
that both adequately identify the characteristics of each territory and, at the same time, are 
collectively rational, or appropriate, at the EU-wide level. 
4 Our analysis was conducted at the regional level, but including the S3 strategies of countries where no sub-
national S3 strategies exist.
15
T
ab
le
 1
.T
op
-2
0 
do
m
ai
ns
an
d 
po
lic
y 
ob
je
ct
iv
es
ac
ro
ss
 S
3 
st
ra
te
gi
es
 in
 th
e 
EU
Ec
on
om
ic
 d
om
ai
ns
Sc
ie
nt
ifi
c 
do
m
ai
ns
Po
lic
y 
ob
je
ct
iv
es
N
am
e
St
ra
te
gi
es
Sh
ar
e
N
am
e
St
ra
te
gi
es
Sh
ar
e
N
am
e
St
ra
te
gi
es
Sh
ar
e
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
se
rv
ic
e 
ac
tiv
iti
es
16
9
0.
69
H
ea
lth
 p
ro
m
ot
io
n
16
4
0.
67
Pu
bl
ic
 h
ea
lth
 &
 w
el
lb
ei
ng
17
6
0.
72
C
om
pu
te
r p
ro
gr
am
m
in
g,
 c
on
su
lta
nc
y 
an
d 
re
la
te
d 
ac
tiv
iti
es
16
7
0.
68
M
ed
ic
al
 s
ci
en
ce
s
15
7
0.
64
Su
st
ai
na
bl
e 
en
er
gy
 &
 re
ne
w
ab
le
s
15
6
0.
64
H
um
an
 h
ea
lth
 a
ct
iv
iti
es
16
4
0.
67
R
en
ew
ab
le
 e
ne
rg
y 
so
ur
ce
s
14
9
0.
61
Ad
va
nc
ed
 m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
sy
st
em
s
13
8
0.
57
El
ec
tri
ci
ty
, g
as
, s
te
am
 a
nd
 a
ir 
co
nd
iti
on
in
g 
su
pp
ly
15
5
0.
64
M
at
he
m
at
ic
s,
 c
om
pu
te
r a
nd
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sc
ie
nc
es
14
8
0.
61
Ad
va
nc
ed
 m
at
er
ia
ls
13
1
0.
54
Sc
ie
nt
ifi
c 
re
se
ar
ch
 a
nd
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t
13
7
0.
56
En
er
gy
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
an
d 
di
st
rib
ut
io
n 
ef
fic
ie
nc
y
14
7
0.
60
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t o
f r
eg
io
na
l c
ul
tu
ra
l &
 
cr
ea
tiv
e 
in
du
st
rie
s
11
6
0.
48
C
ro
p 
an
d 
an
im
al
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n,
 h
un
tin
g 
an
d 
re
la
te
d 
se
rv
ic
e 
ac
tiv
iti
es
13
2
0.
54
Fo
od
 p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
 a
nd
 te
ch
no
lo
gy
14
5
0.
59
e-
H
ea
lth
 (e
.g
. h
ea
lth
y 
ag
ei
ng
)
11
3
0.
46
Fo
od
 p
ro
du
ct
s
12
9
0.
53
Im
pr
ov
in
g 
in
du
st
ria
l p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
an
d 
te
ch
no
lo
gy
14
3
0.
59
R
es
ou
rc
e 
ef
fic
ie
nc
y
10
7
0.
44
M
ac
hi
ne
ry
 a
nd
 e
qu
ip
m
en
t
12
7
0.
52
Pu
bl
ic
 h
ea
lth
 s
er
vi
ce
s
14
0
0.
57
In
du
st
ria
l b
io
te
ch
no
lo
gy
10
7
0.
44
O
th
er
 p
ro
fe
ss
io
na
l, 
sc
ie
nt
ifi
c 
an
d 
te
ch
ni
ca
l a
ct
iv
iti
es
12
6
0.
52
En
er
gy
 e
ffi
ci
en
cy
 -
co
ns
um
pt
io
n
13
7
0.
56
Ec
o-
in
no
va
tio
ns
10
6
0.
43
Te
le
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
ns
11
6
0.
48
En
gi
ne
er
in
g 
Sc
ie
nc
es
13
6
0.
56
Su
st
ai
na
bl
e 
ag
ric
ul
tu
re
10
1
0.
41
C
re
at
iv
e,
 a
rts
 a
nd
 e
nt
er
ta
in
m
en
t a
ct
iv
iti
es
11
3
0.
46
C
ul
tu
ra
l s
er
vi
ce
s
13
5
0.
55
C
le
an
er
 e
nv
iro
nm
en
t &
 e
ffi
ci
en
t 
en
er
gy
 n
et
w
or
ks
 a
nd
 lo
w
 e
ne
rg
y 
co
m
pu
tin
g
95
0.
39
O
th
er
 tr
an
sp
or
t e
qu
ip
m
en
t
10
1
0.
41
M
on
ito
rin
g 
th
e 
he
al
th
 s
itu
at
io
n
13
5
0.
55
Su
pp
or
t t
o 
lin
k 
cu
ltu
ra
l &
 c
re
at
iv
e 
in
du
st
rie
s 
w
ith
 tr
ad
iti
on
al
 in
du
st
rie
s
93
0.
38
C
om
pu
te
r, 
el
ec
tro
ni
c 
an
d 
op
tic
al
 p
ro
du
ct
s
99
0.
41
Ag
ric
ul
tu
re
, a
ni
m
al
 a
nd
 d
ai
ry
 s
ci
en
ce
s
12
5
0.
51
Fo
od
 s
ec
ur
ity
 &
 s
af
et
y
92
0.
38
M
ot
or
 v
eh
ic
le
s,
 tr
ai
le
rs
 a
nd
 s
em
itr
ai
le
rs
98
0.
40
Ag
ric
ul
tu
re
 fo
re
st
ry
 fi
sh
er
y
12
3
0.
50
In
te
llig
en
t i
nt
er
-m
od
al
 &
 s
us
ta
in
ab
le
 
ur
ba
n 
ar
ea
s 
(e
.g
. s
m
ar
t c
iti
es
)
92
0.
38
Be
ve
ra
ge
s
91
0.
37
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
 o
f f
oo
d 
pr
od
uc
ts
12
3
0.
50
N
ew
 o
r i
m
pr
ov
ed
 s
er
vi
ce
 p
ro
ce
ss
es
91
0.
37
Sp
or
ts
 a
ct
iv
iti
es
 a
nd
 a
m
us
em
en
t a
nd
 re
cr
ea
tio
n 
ac
tiv
iti
es
85
0.
35
Te
le
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
sy
st
em
s
11
8
0.
48
Su
st
ai
na
bl
e 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
& 
co
ns
um
pt
io
n
91
0.
37
Ba
si
c 
ph
ar
m
ac
eu
tic
al
 p
ro
du
ct
s 
an
d 
ph
ar
m
ac
eu
tic
al
 
pr
ep
ar
at
io
ns
84
0.
34
R
ec
re
at
io
na
l a
nd
 s
po
rti
ng
 s
er
vi
ce
s
11
5
0.
47
Sm
ar
t g
re
en
 &
 in
te
gr
at
ed
 tr
an
sp
or
t 
sy
st
em
s
87
0.
36
O
th
er
 m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g
83
0.
34
M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
 o
f m
ac
hi
ne
ry
 a
nd
 e
qu
ip
m
en
t
11
5
0.
47
e-
C
om
m
er
ce
 &
 S
M
Es
 o
nl
in
e
86
0.
35
El
ec
tri
ca
l e
qu
ip
m
en
t
83
0.
34
Tr
an
sp
or
t s
ys
te
m
s
11
3
0.
46
Ag
ei
ng
 s
oc
ie
tie
s
86
0.
35
Li
br
ar
ie
s,
 a
rc
hi
ve
s,
 m
us
eu
m
s 
an
d 
ot
he
r c
ul
tu
ra
l 
ac
tiv
iti
es
79
0.
32
Pu
bl
ic
 h
ea
lth
 m
an
ag
em
en
t
11
2
0.
46
D
ig
iti
si
ng
 In
du
st
ry
 (I
nd
us
try
 4
.0
 
sm
ar
t a
nd
 a
dd
iti
ve
 m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g)
86
0.
35
16
The evidence from our cluster analysis5 is partly reassuring in this regard. S3 strategies in 
Europe cluster into five distinctive groups, each with a reasonable geographical spread (Table
A1 in appendix). Based on their prevalent specialisations,6 the groups can be labelled as 
follows: (1) Food and Metal Manufacture; (2) Agrifood and Hospitality; (3) ICT and Health; 
(4) Creative and Leisure; (5) Energy and Resources. This clustering covers a reasonably wide 
range of economic domains, with meaningful sectoral linkages (e.g., agrifood is connected to 
hospitality). Moreover, the membership of territories in these clusters also appears to relate 
reasonably well to the existing specialisations of the territories (for example, the Creative and 
Leisure cluster – cluster 4 in Table A.1 – includes mainly touristic areas; while the Agrifood 
and Hospitality cluster – cluster 3 in Table 1 – includes most of the regions with existing 
specialisations in Agriculture, Food processing and Food services) – while the clusters 
themselves are not spatially fragmented (reproducing, for example, a north-south division). 
Thus, on the whole, our statistical review of the S3 strategies reveals two patterns: on the one 
hand, regions do appear to specialise in economic domains that are relevant, in the sense that 
they relate to existing strengths/specialisations of the regions; on the other hand, across the EU 
space we observe a relative proliferation of specialisations (too many regions specialising in 
too many economic domains), which produces significant overlaps in specialisations across 
territories. This leads to an important first conclusion for our analysis: S3 strategies may be 
individually ‘smart’, but collectively sub-optimal. Our analysis in the next section moves 
beyond this observation, focusing on examining the local economic and institutional factors 
that possibly account for the observed variation in the degree of specialisation of S3 strategies 
across territories. 
 
4. Drivers of regional S3 strategies 
In this section we perform an econometric analysis that examines how particular regional 
characteristics relate with some of the features of S3 strategies discussed above – namely the 
5 We performed a partition (non-hierarchical) clustering using the – cluster k-means – command in Stata. The 
number of clusters was decided based on the Calinski/Harabasz pseudo-F.
6 We define domains as prevalent if they appear in the strategies of at least 70% of territories in any particular 
group. 
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numbers of axes, economic domains, scientific domains and policy objectives appearing in the 
S3 strategy of each territory.
Our goal is to verify whether these aspects link with the structural conditions of EU regions. In 
the absence of prior theoretical knowledge about the drivers of key aspects of S3 strategies, the 
analysis includes a broad range of explanatory variables covering various economic, labour 
market, geographical, socio-demographic, and institutional regional characteristics.7 The 
rationale for including these variables, and our expectations with regard to the types of effects 
that they may relate to, are as follows. 
To examine whether the economic capacity of regions exerts an influence on the characteristics 
of S3 strategies, we include alternatively two measures of agglomeration: population density 
and log-population. As is widely discussed in the new economic geography and urban 
economics literature (e.g. Combes et al., 2008), agglomeration is a key factor linked to 
productivity and consumption externalities and, by implication, to greater degrees of 
diversification. Thus, we expect that higher degrees of agglomeration will also create potential 
for regions to plan strategically their ‘diversified specialisations’ (Farhauer and Kröll, 2012). 
We also include two measures of economic performance, reflecting each region’s position in 
the economic cycle: GDP per capita growth and unemployment. The former captures the 
economic dynamism of each territory: with higher rates of growth, a region can presumably 
afford to be more strategic in its S3 strategies for the future, thus deciding to specialise in fewer 
domains; or instead it could feel empowered to experiment more, thus potentially opting for 
more – or at least more ‘risky’ – specialisations. The latter captures instead the extent of slack 
in the economy and thus possibly more immediate pressures to policy (including for electoral 
reasons – Mechtel and Potrafke, 2013), leading regional policy-makers to ‘spread their bets’,
thus producing more ‘profligate’ strategies. Our model also includes proxies for the 
technological capabilities and available set of skills of places, measured by the log of patent 
applications per million inhabitants8 and the share of adult population with higher education,
7 All variables are measured as averages for the 4 years prior to the beginning of the 2014-2020 period (mean 
values for 2011-2014). This ensures that variables are measured in the period prior to the implementation of S3 
strategies and hence cannot be affected by it, thus minimising any endogeneity concerns.
8 Patents are an imperfect proxy for innovation, but, for lack of a better alternative at a regional level, they have 
been frequently used in the literature looking at regional-level EU innovation capacity (e.g. Bottazzi & Peri 2003). 
A potential alternative would be to use data from the EU Regional Innovation Scoreboard. However, as this is 
available only for few of the regions having ongoing S3 strategies, using this variable – which correlates 90% 
with log patents for the available data – would have implied losing many observations in the analysis.
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respectively. As S3 strategies are expected to leverage on existing knowledge and innovation 
strengths, we expect that regions with higher technological capabilities will be able to support 
a broader number of economic/scientific domains in their strategies.9 Last, we expect that the 
quality and characteristics of S3 strategies will depend heavily on the administrative capacities 
of the regions and on their overall quality of government (Rodríguez-Pose and Di Cataldo, 
2015). We thus introduce a measure of regional government quality in our analysis, adopting 
the widely-employed Quality of Government EU regional indicators developed by the 
University of Gothenburg (Charron et al., 2014).
Formally, we estimate the following model with ordinary least squares (OLS):
3 = +  +  (1)
where 3 is one of the four characteristics (number of axes; number of economic domains; 
number of scientific domains; and number of policy objectives) of S3 strategy in region r;10
represents the vector of regional-level explanatory variables; is the error term.
As the definition of S3 goals and priorities in every single strategy may not follow exclusively 
an identification of local potential, other elements may shape S3 strategic choices at a regional 
level. One important factor potentially shaping the strategy is what neighbouring regions are 
doing. Regional decision-makers and officials when designing their own S3 strategies may be 
concerned with/guided by neighbours’ strategies for a number of reasons. First, they may 
consider that replicating what is done elsewhere is the best way to secure funds (a form of 
mimicking – Revelli, 2002). Second, they may not want to be outdone by their competitors in 
numbers of goals and priorities, due to territorial/yardstick competition considerations
(Rodríguez-Pose & Arbix, 2001; Gordon, 2010). Third, the rapid enactment of S3 at a 
European level may have led to copycat strategies. Finally, the economic returns of European 
9 An alternative specification of the model also tests whether more diversified economies would be able – or, find 
it necessary – to leverage on more economic sectors. To account for this, we include a measure of sectoral 
specialisation (Herfindahl index) based on the share of regional employment in the primary, secondary, and 
tertiary sector. A higher value of the index corresponds to a stronger specialisation. The results of the model 
estimated with the inclusion of this control are reported in Table A3 in the Appendix.
10 Following the S3 Platform classification of 3-digit sectors in each S3 strategy, the dependent variables reflect 
the ‘count’ of targeted S3 sectors by each region at 3-digit level. As a robustness test, we have aggregated targeted 
sectors at 1-digit. The results of the analysis are broadly unaffected by this change.
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policies are highly influenced by whatever strategies neighbours are pursuing (Breidenbach, 
2019). We test for this hypothesis by augmenting model (1) with the spatial lag of the 
dependent variable, capturing the number of axes, economic/scientific domains, and policy 
objectives of regional neighbours. Formally, we estimate the following spatial autoregressive 
(SAR) model with a maximum-likelihood estimation (MLE):
3 = +  +   3 +  (2)
where  3 is the spatial lag of the dependent variable, and the row-normalised spatial weight 
matrix W defines regional neighbours through rook contiguity.11
The sample is composed of EU NUTS regions and some small EU countries. This means that 
we exclude country-level observations from all countries that have both national and regional 
strategies (i.e. Portugal, Germany, Greece, Austria, Denmark, Poland, Romania, and Sweden) 
and consider only their regional S3 strategies. Furthermore, the vector of explanatory 
variables is only available for NUTS1 and NUTS2 regions, thus all NUTS3 Scandinavian 
regions are not considered when variables are included. These variables are also not 
available for non-EU countries, forcing us to exclude Ukraine, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, Moldova, and Turkish regions. 
We present the results from the econometric exploration in Table 2. For all four dependent 
variables, we report the results of the OLS and SAR models in consecutive columns.12 When 
the dependent variable is the number of economic/scientific domains or of policy objectives 
(columns (3)-(8)), we also control for the number of regional axes of S3 strategies. As such, 
our explanatory variables in columns (3)-(8) describe the relationship between a given regional 
socio-economic factor and the number of domains/objectives per axis.
11 We have experimented with alternative definitions of the W matrix. Results (available upon request) are 
consistent across specifications.
12 Given the descriptive nature of our analysis, we do not concern ourselves with issues of endogeneity or inverse 
causality. In the SAR model(s) the reported coefficients represent the sum of the direct and indirect effects of the 
explanatory variables (LeSage and Domínguez 2012). 
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The results show that, on the whole, economic concentrations exert little influence on S3
strategic choices. Population density is never significantly related with S3 strategy 
characteristics;13 while GDP per capita growth and the unemployment rate are only statistically 
significant in a sub-set of the regressions (in the SAR model for the number of axes and in the 
OLS estimates for the number of axes and the number of scientific domains, respectively). Still, 
the signs of the obtained coefficients are in line with expectations – with fast growth being 
associated with more focused strategies and higher unemployment being associated with more 
diffuse strategies, at least in terms of number of axes and scientific domains.
The results for the technological capacity measures are equally weak. The log of patents 
displays a positive coefficient in most specifications, indicating perhaps that more innovative 
regions tend to develop more axes and identify more investment domains, but the estimates are 
only statistically significant in two cases – concerning the numbers of axes and of economic 
domains (columns (1) and (3)). Instead, the human capital variable is never statistically 
significant and enters with different signs across specifications. It thus appears that, like the 
economic variables, technological capacity plays only a limited role in the design of S3 
strategies. As these strategies are supposed to be devised exactly with the 
technological/innovation capacity of regions in mind, this finding is somewhat perplexing.
The last regional factor considered in the analysis is the quality of regional governments. In 
this case, the results are stronger across specifications, with the quality of government not 
correlating significantly with the number of axes but returning a strong and consistent negative 
coefficient on the number of economic domains per axis. This result confirms the idea that the
proliferation of investment targets in S3 strategies is a sub-optimal policy choice often 
conducted by regions with weaker governance structures. Regions with better institutional 
capacity tend to be much more selective when it comes to identifying the areas in which to 
invest.
In addition to the relatively poor performance of the variables representing various regional 
characteristics, the inclusion of spatial lags of the dependent variables leads to important 
findings. Across all regressions, the coefficients of the spatial lags (columns (2), (4), (6), and
(8)), are always positive and statistically significant. Such finding suggests that the 
13 As an alternative specification, we have estimated our regression substituting population density with log 
population. The results are shown in Table A2 in the Appendix. The coefficient of log population is only mildly 
significant in the first estimation (column (1), Table A2), while it is insignificant in all other specifications. All 
other coefficient are unchanged from our main model. 
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characteristics of S3 strategies of neighbouring areas represent strong predictors of how a given 
region develops its own strategy. While this may be due to neighbouring regions having similar 
needs,14 it can also signal that these regions struggle to find their S3 priorities and thus set these 
up by observing what their neighbours do. In other words, they may be simply replicating their 
approach. Hence, rather than trying to address their main bottlenecks, by prioritising 
exclusively areas in which strength or potential has been identified, many EU regions mostly 
seem to be replicating the strategic choices of their neighbours. This would seem to cast doubts 
on whether S3 priorities are truly set in order to foster the selected competitive advantages of 
places and could raise legitimate concerns as to whether the specialisations proposed and 
pursued by individual regions are consistent with the macro-objectives of the S3 policy 
framework. 
We test the robustness of our findings in a number of ways. First, we replace population density 
with log population as control and add a variable accounting for the sectoral composition of 
the regions (Herfindahl index). Second, we also ran a simple SAR-lag model without additional 
controls for regional characteristics using alternatively a spatial weights matrix (W) based on 
inverse distance. This allows us also to include in the sample the full set of countries and 
regions with S3 strategies (again excluding higher-level strategies when lower-level ones are 
available). The results (see Tables A2, A3, A4 in the Appendix), are highly consistent, 
confirming the spatial lag-dependence of S3 strategies and the limited role played by region-
specific economic and technological characteristics.
These results also highlight that the tendency of regions to ‘imitate’ the S3 strategies of 
neighbouring areas decreases with institutional quality. Table A5, reproducing the estimates 
with no controls and splitting the sample by different quartiles of government quality, suggests 
this is the case. Regions with higher quality institutions are less likely to be replicating the S3 
policy choices of their neighbours (insignificant spatial lag). In contrast, regions in the two 
lowest quartiles of government quality do so in a systematic way (positive and significant
spatial lag for regions with QoG < 0) (Table A5).
14 Given the performance of the substantive variables in the regressions, however, such needs would not seem to 
be related to the economic and technological capacities of regions. 
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5. Conclusions 
The 2014 reform of the EU’s Cohesion Policy brought about a significant strategic shift in 
development intervention across countries and regions in Europe. Despite some initial 
misgivings by the academics behind the concept – who described its rapid policy adoption by 
the EU as “policy running ahead of theory” (Foray et al., 2001:1) – S3 was widely implemented 
even in countries outside the EU. S3 has represented a substantial shift from previous policy. 
It marked the transition to a more place-based, bottom-up Cohesion Policy intended on 
identifying the strategic potential of each and every territory in the EU (Midtkandal and Sörvik, 
2012). By using an individual entrepreneurial discovery process the aim was to adapt 
development intervention to the varying conditions and potential of each region and country 
while, simultaneously, raising the overall effectiveness of cohesion intervention.
This implied a thorough transformation of the old Cohesion Policy extending the shift of the 
‘place based’ approach towards a ‘territorialised’ industrial policy, by introducing a new way 
of thinking about territorial development in the EU. EU countries and regions have been 
required in S3 strategies to identify and harness their dynamic advantages, so as to unleash 
their growth potential. The idea has been to create a more efficient and ‘smarter’ policy, more 
capable of improving the development prospects of territories and the well-being of citizens 
wherever they live in Europe.
Yet, despite the importance of the reform, to date there has been virtually no evaluation of the 
extent to which the S3 strategies designed and implemented by countries and regions truly 
reflect the economic characteristics of each territory. This has been the goal of this paper. We 
have found that S3 strategies are, by and large, very loosely connected with the characteristics 
of the region. With the exception of local government quality, the economic and scientific 
domains as well as the policy objectives included in the strategies are not reflective of the 
intrinsic conditions of each region. Only territories with better governance structures and 
government quality have strategies that are more concise and focused, meaning that these 
territories are pursuing clearer and less complex strategies with a more realistic and manageable 
number of priorities. 
Rather than reflecting the intrinsic characteristics of each territory, S3 strategies, to a large 
extent, mimic what neighbouring areas are doing. A sort of copycat system – which is far more 
prevalent among regions with a low government quality – dominates by which countries and 
regions define their number of economic and scientific domains and their policy priorities by 
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what their neighbours do, rather than by their own needs and perceived potential. This accounts, 
to a large extent, for the proliferation of priorities and lack of distinctiveness of strategies 
observed in our descriptive analysis. 
Hence, the question that remains is whether ‘smart’ specialisation is really smart. Given the 
results of the analysis, it can be said that in the way it has been applied S3 is not yet ‘smart’ 
enough. Most S3 strategies include far too many axes of intervention; and a limited coincidence 
with the strengths and specialisation of the territories for which the strategies develop remains 
the norm. Further research will be required in order to assess the efficiency of the massive S3 
experiment once the payments linked to the 2014-2020 programming period are wrapped up. 
However, the tendency, especially by regions with a low government quality, to mostly imitate 
what the neighbours are doing and have a ‘token compliance’ with EU requirements is likely 
to lead to inefficient strategies that fail to deliver on their promise of mobilising the local 
economic potential and improving development levels and quality of life across the whole of 
Europe. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Clusters of territories/strategies on the basis of economic domains
Cluster
No of 
territories / 
strategies
Specialisations Name of cluster Territories
1 49
Food products, 
Fabricated metal 
products, 
Computers and 
electronics, 
Machinery and 
equipment n.e.c.
Food and 
Metal 
Manufacture
Kärnten, Oberösterreich (AT); Kentriki Makedonia (EL); Galicia, 
Principado de Asturias, La Rioja (ES); Satakunta, Kanta-Häme, 
Pohjois-Pohjanmaa (FI); Champagne-Ardenne, Picardie, Haute-
Normandie, Bourgogne, Lorraine, Aquitaine, Midi-Pyrénées (FR); 
Piemonte, Valle d'Aosta, Campania, Calabria, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia, Toscana, Marche (IT); Eastern Netherlands (NL); Rogaland, 
Møre og Romsdal (NO); Lódzkie, Lubelskie, Wielkopolskie, 
Zachodniopomorskie, Opolskie (PL); Nord-Vest, Centru, Sud-Est, Sud-
Muntenia, Vest (RO); Södermanlands, Östergötlands, Västmanlands, 
Västra Götalands (SE); Kocaeli, Konya (TR); Greater Manchester 
(UK); Estonia; Lithuania; Latvia; Moldova; Slovenia
2 37
Agriculture, 
Food 
processing, 
Accommodation, 
Food services; 
Computer 
programming, 
Information 
services
Agrifood and 
Hospitality
Burgenland (AT); Nordrhein-Westfalen (DE); Anatoliki Makedonia & 
Thraki, Dytiki Makedonia, Thessalia, Ionia Nisia, Dytiki Ellada, Sterea 
Ellada, Attiki, Voreio Aigaio (EL); Castilla-La Mancha, Extremadura, 
Comunidad Valenciana, Andalucía, Canarias (ES); Päijät-Häme, 
Kymenlaakso, Etelä-Karjala, Pohjois-Savo (FI); Provence-Alpes-Côte 
d'Azur, Martinique (FR); Puglia (IT); Sogn og Fjordane (NO); 
Malopolskie, Swietokrzyskie, Lubuskie (PL); Norte, Algarve, Centro, 
Região Autónoma dos Açores, Região Autónoma da Madeira (PT); 
Vojvodina (RS); Kronobergs, Kalmar, Dalarnas, Västernorrlands (SE); 
Montenegro
3 73
Telecoms, 
Computer 
programming, 
Information 
services, 
Scientific R&D; 
Human health
ICT and 
Health
Niederösterreich, Wien, Steiermark, Salzburg, Tirol, Vorarlberg (AT); 
Republika Srpska (BA); Flemish Region, Région Wallonne (BE); Praha 
(CZ); Baden-Württemberg, Bayern, Berlin, Brandenburg, Hamburg, 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Rheinland-Pfalz, Saarland, Sachsen,
Sachsen-Anhalt, Thüringen (DE); Cantabria (ES); Keski-Suomi, Etelä-
Savo, Pohjois-Karjala, Kainuu, Keski-Pohjanmaa, Lappi (FI); Île de 
France, Centre, Basse-Normandie, Nord - Pas-de-Calais, Franche-
Comté, Pays de la Loire, Bretagne, Auvergne, Languedoc-Roussillon, 
Guadeloupe, Guyane (FR); Liguria, Abruzzo, Molise, Sicilia, Sardegna, 
Provincia Autonoma di Bolzano/Bozen, Provincia Autonoma di Trento, 
Emilia-Romagna, Umbria, Lazio (IT); Southern Netherlands (NL); Oslo, 
Akershus, Hordaland (NO); Mazowieckie, Slaskie, Podkarpackie, 
Dolnoslaskie, Kujawsko-Pomorskie (PL); Stockholms, Uppsala, 
Blekinge, Skåne, Hallands, Västerbottens (SE); Kharkiv (UA); Cornwall 
and Isles of Scilly, Wales, Northern Ireland, England (UK); Bulgaria; 
Ireland; Malta; Slovakia
4 35
Creative and 
entertainment 
activities, 
Libraries and 
cultural 
activities, and 
Sports and 
recreation 
activities
Creative and 
Leisure
Syddanmark, Midtjylland, Nordjylland (DK); Ipeiros, Peloponnisos, 
Notio Aigaio, Kriti (EL); Illes Balears (ES); Limousin, Corse, Réunion 
(FR); Lombardia, Basilicata (IT); Western Netherlands (NL); Hedmark, 
Oppland, Buskerud, Vestfold, Aust-Agder, Vest-Agder, Sør-Trøndelag, 
Nord-Trøndelag, Nordland, Troms, Finnmark (NO); Warminsko-
Mazurskie (PL); Lisboa, Alentejo (PT); Örebro, Gotlands, Värmlands, 
Jämtlands, Norrbottens (SE); Kent, Scotland (UK)
5 35
Electricity, gas 
and steam; 
Water collection 
and treatment; 
Waste collection 
and treatment; 
and Other waste 
management 
services
Energy and 
Resources
Brussels-Capital Region (BE); Bremen, Hessen, Niedersachsen, 
Schleswig-Holstein (DE); Hovedstaden, Sjælland (DK); País Vasco, 
Comunidad Foral de Navarra, Aragón, Comunidad de Madrid, Castilla 
y León, Cataluña, Región de Murcia (ES); Etelä-Pohjanmaa, 
Pohjanmaa, Pirkanmaa, Helsinki-Uusimaa, Varsinais-Suomi (FI); 
Alsace, Poitou-Charentes, Rhône-Alpes (FR); Northern Netherlands 
(NL); Østfold (NO); Podlaskie, Pomorskie (PL); Nord-Est, Sud-Vest 
Oltenia (RO); Gävleborgs (SE); Cherkasy (UA); Northamptonshire 
(UK); Cyprus; Croatia; Hungary; Luxembourg
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Table A4. Robustness test – SAR model, all regions and countries in sample
Dependent variable: Axes Economic domains Scientific domains Policy objectives
W: Contiguity Inv. dist. Contiguity Inv. dist. Contiguity Inv. dist. Contiguity Inv. dist.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
W axes 0.346*** 0.413***
(0.0575) (0.124)
W economic domains 0.352*** 0.484***
(0.0609) (0.164)
W scientific domains 0.472*** 0.616***
(0.0579) (0.184)
W policy objectives 0.451*** 0.284
(0.0610) (0.214)
Constant 3.363*** 3.596*** 11.27*** 11.39*** 13.50*** 14.33*** 9.184*** 12.76***
(0.313) (0.443) (1.159) (1.966) (1.658) (3.138) (1.095) (2.277)
Observations 243 243 243 243 243 243 243 243
Standard errors in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variables: number of S3 axes per 
region (columns (1), (2)); number of S3 economic domains per region (columns (3), (4)); number of S3 scientific 
domains per region (columns (5), (6)); number of S3 policy objective per region (columns (7), (8)). Models are 
estimated with MLE. Spatial weight obtained with row-standardised rook contiguity matrix in columns ((1), (3), 
(5), (7)) and with inverse distance in columns ((2), (4), (6), (8)). The sample consists of the territories included in 
Table 2, plus all Scandinavian regions and non-EU territories with S3 strategies. In countries where only some 
regions have submitted a regional strategy, all regions that did not submit a strategy have been assigned the value 
of zero to axes and domains. For example, in the Czech Republic, where only Prague has submitted a regional 
strategy, all regions except Prague have been assigned the value of zero to axes and domain.
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